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Testing the Social Media Waters: First 
Amendment Entanglement Beyond the 
Schoolhouse Gates 
LILY M. STRUMWASSER1 
“Teachers, principals, legislators, and judges have been wrangling for 
decades in their attempts to find the right doctrinal formula for school 
speech.”2 
I.  THE NEW AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Social media is an integral part of modern society.  People of all 
generations use social media as an online platform to share information 
and interact with known and unknown contacts.3  There is an online 
resource for virtually every interest imaginable.  People can share videos 
 
 1. Lily Strumwasser is an attorney in the Chicago office of Seyfarth Shaw LLP in the 
area of labor and employment law.  Ms. Strumwasser publishes regularly on a variety of 
employment and litigation topics, including social media compliance issues, focusing on 
best practices to avoid litigation and develop internal compliance initiatives.  Prior to 
joining Seyfarth, Ms. Strumwasser held a judicial externship with the Honorable Charles 
Kocoras of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the Honorable 
James G. Carr of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.  Contact: 
lstrumwasser@seyfarth.com. 
From the author: A special thanks to Ira, Jennifer, and Conor for your encouragement 
and unwavering support.  I would also like to thank Theodore Sky, Professor of 
Education Law and retired senior counsel to the general counsel of the U.S. Department 
of Education, and Mary Kay Klimesh, Partner at Seyfarth Shaw LLP for their invaluable 
insight and assistance on the development of this Article. 
 2. ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2009). 
 3. See Sana Rouis, Moez Limayem & Esmail Salehi-Sangari, Impact of Facebook 
Usage on Students’ Academic Achievement: Roles of Self-Regulation and Trust, 9(3) ELEC. J. 
OF RES. IN EDUC. PSYCHOL. 961, 965 (2011), http://investigacion-psicopedagogica.org/ 
revista/new/english/ContadorArticulo.php?620. 
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on YouTube,4 post pictures on Pinterest,5 and offer status updates on 
Twitter.6  Professionals can network by displaying their resumes on 
LinkedIn7 or through advertising their businesses on blogs.8  Reddit is a 
social news site that permits users to comment on posted items.9  The 
online dating industry is also a hot commodity.  In 2012, over forty 
million people used websites such as eHarmony and Match.com.10  And 
then there is Facebook—the world’s largest social network.11  Facebook 
alone has 1.4 billion members.12 
 
 4. See YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).  In 2011, 
“YouTube ha[d] 490 million unique users who visit[ed] every month,” and “generate[d] 
92 billion page views per month.”  Jeff Bullas, 20 Stunning Social Media Statistics Plus 
Infographic, JEFFBULLAS.COM (Sept. 2, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.jeffbullas.com/2011/ 
09/02/20-stunning-social-media-statistics/.  Furthermore, “[u]sers on YouTube spen[t] a 
total of 2.9 billion hours per month” on the site. Id. 
 5. See PINTEREST, https://pinterest.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).  In May 2012, 
Pinterest was “the third most popular social network, behind Twitter and Facebook (in 
the U.S.).”  Cara Pring, 99 New Social Media Stats for 2012, THE SOCIAL SKINNY, (May 10, 
2012), http://thesocialskinny.com/99-new-social-media-stats-for-2012/. 
 6. See TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).  On average, in 
2011, Twitter handled 1.6 billion queries per day. Bullas, supra note 4.  Additionally, in 
May 2011, there were approximately 190 Tweets posted per day, and roughly 500,000 
users were added to the site. Id.  Furthermore, in 2012, “65% of the world’s top 
companies ha[d] an active Twitter profile.” Pring, supra note 5. 
 7. See LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 8. In 2012, “91% of experienced social marketers [saw] improved website traffic 
due to social media campaigns and 79% [were] generating more quality leads.” Pring, 
supra note 5.  Meanwhile, “23% of Fortune 500 companies ha[d] a public-facing 
corporate blog[,]” and “53% of small businesses [were] using social media.” Id. 
 9. See REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 10. See Online Dating Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (June 18, 2013), http://www. 
statisticbrain.com/online-dating-statistics/. 
 11. See Ken Burbary, Facebook Demographics Revisted – 2011 Statistics, SOCIALMEDIA 
TODAY (March 7, 2011), http://socialmediatoday.com/kenburbary/276356/facebook-
demographics-revisited-2011-statistics. 
 12. See Social Networking Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www. 
statisticbrain.com/social-networking-statistics/.  An average Facebook user spends 15 
hours and 33 minutes on Facebook per month.  Id.  Mark Zuckerberg launched 
Facebook in 2004 when he was a student at Harvard University. See Sid Yadav, Facebook 
- The Complete Biography, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2006), http://mashable.com/2006/08/25/ 
facebook-profile/.  Zuckerberg’s audience was originally college students, and 
membership was restricted to students of Harvard University.  One year later, Facebook 
expanded to twenty-one universities. Shortly thereafter, Facebook further expanded to 
permit high school students to access the social networking site.  Now, virtually 
anyone—including companies—can create a Facebook profile. Hits and Misses in 
Facebook’s History, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 19, 2013 9:24 AM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/hits-and-misses-facebooks-history-0. 
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A recent study examined the use of social networking websites and 
revealed that seventy-nine percent of American adults use the Internet, 
and fifty-nine percent of adult Internet users report that they use at least 
one type of social networking website.13  Although adults have a clear 
presence in social media, teenagers and young adults largely dominate 
the industry.14  A striking ninety-eight percent of individuals eighteen to 
twenty-four years old are connected to social media.15 
Near constant connection to smart phones, iPads, and laptop 
computers has made social media accessible almost anytime and 
anywhere.  The emergence of social media has created undeniable 
disruptions at schools—especially inside the classroom.  Cyber speech 
raises legal issues relating to the forum of speech and the audience by 
which it is heard.  Now more than ever, courts are faced with the 
question of whether school administrators can discipline students for 
their off-campus cyber speech.16  There are no clear guidelines that 
dictate the extent to which school administrators may discipline 
students for such speech.17  In fact, only a handful of circuit courts have 
weighed in on this issue.18  Nevertheless, such decisions have “produced 
 
 13. See Keith N. Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, PEW INTERNET 
& AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 3 (June 16, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/ 
Reports/2011/PIP%20-%20Social%20networking%20sites%20and%20our%20lives.pdf. 
 14. Social Networking Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Aug. 12, 2013) http:// 
www.statisticbrain.com/social-networking-statistics/. 
 15. Id.; see also Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Social Media, PEW INTERNET & 
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 25 (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/ 
Reports/2007/PIP_Teens_Social_Media_Final.pdf.pdf (reporting that ninety-three 
percent of teens use the Internet). 
 16. See Heidi A. Katz & Colette L. McCarty, Student Rights and Responsibilities, ILL. 
INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 7.5, at 7-14 (2010), available at https://www.iicle. 
com/links/SchoolLawPSI10-Ch7-McCarty.pdf.  (“The extent to which school officials 
may discipline or restrict off-campus ‘speech’ by students on the Internet consistent with 
the First Amendment has been a growing concern for the last decade.”). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the school was authorized to discipline a student for off-campus speech that 
“interfered with the work and discipline of the school”); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the school violated 
a student’s free speech rights when it disciplined the student for creating a fake MySpace 
profile of his principal); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 302 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that the school did not violate a student’s free speech rights by 
disciplining the student for creating a vulgar, fake social media profile of the principal 
which depicted the principal as a pedophile); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (holding that the school did not violate the First Amendment by not allowing 
a student to re-run for a class office after the student called school administrators 
3
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a welter of precedents reflecting divergent reasoning and less-than-
predictable outcomes.”19 
Because legal issues involving technology and education are 
complex and unprecedented, it is only a matter of time until the United 
States Supreme Court addresses the question of when schools can 
discipline students for off-campus cyber speech.  Until that time, 
however, school administrators are in a “flex” position left wondering 
whether disciplining a student for content on a social media website will 
violate the First Amendment.  This Article charts new territory and 
addresses the extent to which school administrators can regulate 
students’ off-campus cyber speech. 
A. First Amendment Rights Collide with the Schoolhouse Gates—What 
Have Courts Decided and Where Do We Go from Here?  
This Article begins with a brief overview of the Supreme Court 
rulings that provide the applicable body of law for determining when 
school administrators can restrict student speech.  Part II of this Article 
addresses Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,”20 
which provides the “most quoted adage in school law literature . . . 
[that] students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”21  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tinker defined the contours of student free speech within 
public schools.  Part II also discusses the most transformative student 
speech cases following Tinker, including: Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser22 and Morse v. Frederick.23 
Part III examines the growing uncertainty among federal courts 
regarding the extent to which school authorities may discipline students 
for off-campus cyber speech.  Parts IV and V attempt to clarify the 
various rulings and advocate recognition of a clear standard for school 
administrators to apply to off-campus cyber speech.  Ultimately, this 
Article provides suggestions to school administrators in dealing with off-
 
“douchebags” on a social media website); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the school did not violate the 
First Amendment for suspending a student after the student had circulated AOL instant 
messaging icons depicting the shooting of the student’s English teacher). 
 19. Katz & McCarty, supra note 16, § 7.5 at 7-14. 
 20. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 21. Katz & McCarty, supra note 16, § 7.2 at 7-7 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
 22. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 23. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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campus cyber speech that may—or may not—be actionable inside the 
schoolhouse gates. 
B. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right that our founding fathers 
explicitly included in the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.24  The legal protections of the First Amendment are a 
critical component of democracy.  Free speech supports the marketplace 
of ideas—the freedom to express conflicting ideas so that the truth will 
emerge.25  Free speech allows people to criticize the government and 
each other, as well as to formulate their own ideas.  Free speech 
encourages stability, neutrality, and restraint from tyranny, corruption, 
and ineptitude.  It is designed in the hope that use of such freedom will 
“ultimately produce a more capable citizenry.”26  Although the First 
Amendment protects the fundamental right to free speech, this right is 
not absolute in nature.27  Free speech rights are subject to restrictions, 
and in limited circumstances, the prevention and punishment of speech 
is constitutional.28 
The first Supreme Court case to apply the concept of free speech to 
the public school setting was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, which emerged in the midst of the Vietnam 
War.29  The case began when John F. Tinker, his friend Chris, and his 
sister Mary Beth created a plan to wear black armbands to school as a 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512. 
 26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).  The Cohen Court explained the 
hope as follows: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as 
diverse and populous as ours.  It is designed and intended to remove 
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the 
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in 
the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable 
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which 
our political system rests. 
Id. 
 27. See generally, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). 
 28. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (noting that the public’s interest in national security may at times entitle the 
government to curtail freedom of speech rights). 
 29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
5
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symbol of their opposition to the War.30  The students’ intention was “to 
make their views [about the Vietnam War] known, and, by their 
example, to influence others to adopt them.”31  The school principal 
became aware of the students’ plan and implemented a policy that 
forbade students from wearing an armband to school.32  Nevertheless, 
the students proceeded with their plan and wore black armbands to 
school.33  Their political expression was “silent, passive . . . [and] 
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of the 
[students].”34  The school suspended the students and told them that 
they could not return to school until they removed their armbands.35 
The students refused to remove their armbands and accepted the 
suspensions.36 Subsequently, the students’ fathers filed a complaint on 
their children’s behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Iowa.37  The parents challenged the constitutionality of the school 
authorities’ action and argued that the suspensions violated the students’ 
First Amendment freedom of speech rights.38  The district court 
dismissed the parents’ complaint, and the parents appealed to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.39  The Eighth Circuit heard the 
case en banc and affirmed the district court’s decision.40   
The parents petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and a writ 
of certiorari was granted.41  The Supreme Court balanced the students’ 
First Amendment rights against the Court’s “repeated[] emphasi[s] [on] 
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of 
school officials . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”42  
The Court explained that disciplining a student for her expressive 
conduct is only permissible if the student’s conduct is disruptive and 
 
 30. Id. at 504. 
 31. Id. at 514. 
 32. Id. at 504. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 508. 
 35. Id. at 504. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sc. Dist., 258 F.Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966) 
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 38. Id. at 972. 
 39. Id. at 973. 
 40. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) 
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 41. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 390 U.S. 942 (1968). 
 42. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
6
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“intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.”43  
Based on this standard, the Court held that the students’ conduct of 
wearing the armbands was “closely akin to ‘pure speech’ . . . [and was] 
entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”44  
The Court reasoned that only a few of the students wore armbands, and 
there was no evidence that “the work of the schools or any class was 
disrupted.”45  Because the school provided no evidence that the students’ 
speech interfered with school order, the Court concluded that the school 
administrators’ actions impinged on the students’ right to express their 
opinions in violation of the First Amendment.46 
Tinker teaches school authorities that “students . . . [do not] shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”47  However, Tinker also makes clear that school 
authorities may discipline students when their speech “materially and 
substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline 
in the operation of the school.”48  To reach the level of “material” and 
“substantial” disruption, school officials’ concerns about students’ use of 
speech or expression must be based on “something more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”49 
The determination of whether a student’s actions are disruptive is a 
“fact-intensive” analysis.50  Thus, courts have reached varying 
conclusions as to what constitutes a substantial disruption at school.  
For example, in B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District, the Eighth 
Circuit held that school administrators did not violate the First 
Amendment when they restricted a student from wearing a shirt with a 
Confederate flag on it because such clothing would reasonably result in 
classroom disruption.51  However, in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court permitted a school administrator to 
censor an article on teen pregnancy from a school newspaper because it 
 
 43. Id. at 508. 
 44. Id. at 505–06. 
 45. Id. at 508. 
 46. Id. at 514. 
 47. Id. at 506. 
 48. Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 
(1966)). 
 49. Id.; see also Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student 
Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 628 (2002) (discussing Tinker and how it currently 
applies to schools’ ability to regulate student speech). 
 50. Miller, supra note 49, at 635. 
 51. B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2009). 
7
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determined that the administrator’s actions were reasonable in the 
interest of time constraints and in the protection of the privacy rights of 
those mentioned in the article.52  Over the last several decades, 
numerous other courts have addressed student conduct to determine 
whether it reaches the level of substantial disruption.53 
C.   Departing from the Disruptive Effect Analysis––Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser 
For almost twenty years, Tinker was the “primary authority 
governing the scope of free expression in the schools.”54  However, in 
1986 in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme Court 
distinguished its protective position with regard to speech as witnessed 
in Tinker.55 
In Fraser, a student gave a speech at a school assembly nominating 
another student for a student office position.56  His speech was sexually 
explicit, and in the speech, he encouraged his fellow classmates to vote 
for his friend in the upcoming election.57  The assistant principal of the 
school then notified the student that his speech violated the school’s 
“disruptive-conduct rule,” which prohibited conduct that “substantially 
interfere[d] with the educational process.”58  As a result, the assistant 
principal suspended the student for three days and announced that the 
student would not be considered as a possible candidate for graduation 
speaker at the school’s commencement ceremonies.59 
The student’s father filed a suit on his son’s behalf, alleging that the 
school’s disciplinary actions violated his son’s First Amendment right to 
 
 52. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262–63, 274–76 (1988). 
 53. See, e.g., Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding that symptoms of “substantial disruption” are proven “if there is reason to 
think that a particular type of student speech will lead to a decline in students’ test 
scores, [or] an upsurge in truancy”); Jenkins v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 
1003 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that students’ speech amounted to “substantial 
interference” when the students were going around the campus loudly beckoning fellow 
students to organize and rally); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(holding that wearing anti-war demonstration buttons and distributing pamphlets 
amounted to substantial disruption). 
 54. RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND 
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2:3, at 350 (2004). 
 55. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986). 
 56. Id. at 677. 
 57. Id. at 677–78. 
 58. Id. at 678. 
 59. Id. 
8
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freedom of speech and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.60  The U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington agreed with the father, awarded the student monetary relief, 
and “enjoined the School District from preventing [the student] from 
speaking at the commencement ceremonies.”61  The School District 
appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
subsequently affirmed.62 
Following its grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court first noted the 
“[t]he marked distinction between the political ‘message’ of the 
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of [Fraser’s] speech in this 
case.”63  The Supreme Court then stressed “that the constitutional rights 
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the 
rights of adults in other settings.”64  The Fraser Court held that “[t]he 
First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining 
that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the 
school’s basic educational mission.”65  Thus, the Court reversed and 
remanded the lower court’s decision, and upheld the disciplinary action 
taken against the student.66  The Court reasoned that the student’s 
speech was inappropriate for the audience of young students and that it 
was “wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school 
education.”67  Two important points can be discerned from the Court’s 
holding in Fraser.  First, had Fraser delivered the speech off-campus, he 
 
 60. Id. at 679. 
 61. Id. at 675–76. 
 62. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) rev’d, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986). 
 63. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680. 
 64. Id. at 682.  See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
506 (1969) (noting that students’ speech rights are not the same as the rights of adults 
and, therefore, the rights of students must be applied “in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment”). 
 65. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 66. Id. at 686–87. 
 67. Id. at 685–86.  Another Supreme Court case supports this idea that the school 
stands in a special relationship to students when it comes to the harmful influences of 
society, such as illegal drugs.  See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (allowing suspicionless drug tests 
to be conducted in public schools).  It follows that schools have greater flexibility to 
proscribe speech when they deem it contrary to educational interests—the old in loco 
parentis principle.  This rationale also lies behind the decision in Morse v. Frederick.  See 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007) (upholding a school’s decision to 
discipline a student for displaying a banner advocating drug use at a school-sanctioned 
event). 
9
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would have been protected, but, because he acted on the school’s 
campus, his speech was not protected.  Second, Fraser established that 
the Tinker substantial disruption analysis is not absolute.68 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fraser is a triumph for school 
administrators.69  Fraser emphasizes “the importance of permitting the 
expression of a variety of viewpoints in the schools,” yet simultaneously 
broadens the deference owed to school administrators in making 
disciplinary decisions.70  Writing for the majority of the Court, Chief 
Justice Burger “deferred to the school authorities’ conclusory 
determination that Fraser’s speech seriously disrupted the school’s 
educational activities.”71 
D. Testing the Limits of Tinker and Fraser––Student Off-Campus Speech 
From Tinker and Fraser emerged two standards that are the bedrock 
of school law decisions.72  Although courts “pay[] homage to the legacy 
of Tinker [and Fraser],”73 it “is not completely clear whether [Tinker and] 
Fraser appl[y] to off-campus student speech.”74  “Some courts have 
drawn a distinction between student conduct that occurs on or off 
campus in determining whether school officials may take action against 
the student.”75  Other courts have found that misconduct that occurs 
 
 68. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680. 
 69. Applying Fraser, lower courts have held that school officials may prohibit 
students from wearing t-shirts that display vulgar messages, “even if the messages were 
political, or the substance of the message conveyed was one supported by the school.” 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 353.  The standard set forth in Fraser “will generally 
allow school officials to restrict vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive speech.”  Id. § 2:3 at 
360. 
 70. S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, Rights, and Respect: 
A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 131 (1995). 
 71. Id. 
 72. SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 359–61. 
 73. Miller, supra note 49, at 636. 
 74. SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 222 (Supp. 2012) (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 
642 F.3d 334, 347–48 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 449 (2011) (“[T]he 
applicability of Fraser to plainly offensive off-campus student speech is uncertain . . . .”)).  
But see Layshock ex. rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (en banc) (concluding that Fraser does not 
apply to student’s off-campus speech); J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, 932 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (en banc) (“Fraser does 
not apply to off-campus speech.”). 
 75. SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:3 at 210 (Supp. 2012); see also James M. Patrick, 
Comment, The Civility-Police: The Rising Need to Balance Students’ Rights to Off-Campus 
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol36/iss1/1
1. STRUMWASSER_FINAL - 1.8.14 WITH HEADING 1/17/2014  5:17 PM 
2013] SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11 
outside of the school setting is not out of the reach of schools’ 
disciplinary authority.76   
For example, in Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court grappled 
with whether it was within the school’s authority to discipline a student 
for speech that occurred off-campus, but at a school-sponsored event.77  
In Morse, students and adults gathered across the street from the school 
premises to watch the Olympic torch pass by their school.78  As the torch 
went by, the students unrolled a banner that read, “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS.”79  The school principal was at the event and ordered the 
students to put away the banner.80 Fredrick refused to follow the 
principal’s instructions.81  As a result, the principal took the banner from 
Fredrick and subsequently suspended him for ten days.82 
Frederick filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Alaska and argued that the principal’s action of suspending him and 
confiscating his banner violated his First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech.83  Specifically, Fredrick argued that the school could not 
suspend him for speech that occurred off the school’s premises.84  The 
district court granted summary judgment for the school, and Fredrick 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.85  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court’s decision.86 
The Ninth Circuit noted that although Frederick was off campus 
when the incident occurred, he was at a school-authorized activity.87  
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s decision hinged on its finding that 
Fredrick’s display of the banner did not cause a substantial disruption, 
 
Internet Speech Against the School’s Compelling Interests, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 864–65 
(2010). 
 76. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).  Lower courts have “held 
that school authorities [can] restrict vulgar student personal speech either because the 
manner of expression [is] inappropriate or because disruption could be reasonably 
forecast given the manner or content . . . of the expression.” SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 
2:3 at 360. 
 77. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396. 
 78. Id. at 397. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 398. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Frederick v. Morse, No. 02-008-CV, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27270, at *4. 
 84. Id. at *15–16. 
 85. Id. at *25. 
 86. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 87. Id. 
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and therefore the school’s discipline was unconstitutional.88  In sum, the 
Ninth Circuit found no disruption, and thus no basis for discipline.89 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.90  Finding in favor of the 
school, the Supreme Court reasoned that it had the authority to 
discipline Frederick without violating the First Amendment.91  The 
Supreme Court found that even though Fredrick’s action occurred off-
campus, it took place during school hours and at an approved school 
event, where the school’s rules applied to students’ conduct.92  Because 
of the nexus between the conduct and the school setting, the Court 
noted that a student’s off-campus activity is not necessarily a haven from 
school discipline.93 
The Court also applied Tinker to the case, finding that when 
student speech is reasonably construed as promoting illegal drug use, 
school officials may conclude that it will “materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”94  The Court stated that 
“[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school environment’ . . . and the 
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools 
to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting 
illegal drug use.”95  The Court noted the warnings from Tinker, 
cautioning school administrators that they cannot prohibit student 
speech because of “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”96  
However, it stated, “[t]he danger here is far more serious and palpable. 
The particular concern to prevent student drug abuse at issue here, 
embodied in established school policy . . . extends well beyond an 
abstract desire to avoid controversy.”97 
Thus, Morse extended the reach of Tinker to off-campus school-
sponsored events that are supervised by school authorities.  The Court 
relied on the nexus between the student’s off-campus conduct and the 
school setting.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Morse supports the 
proposition that in certain scenarios, the reasonable likelihood that a 
 
 88. Id. at 1123. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400 (2007). 
 91. Id. at 397. 
 92. Id. at 400–01. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 403, 410 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 513 (1969)). 
 95. Id. at 408. 
 96. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). 
 97. Id. at 408–09. 
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student’s conduct will cause a disruption with the school’s educational 
mission is enough to warrant discipline.98 
In contrast to Morse, in Klein v. Smith, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maine held that the school did not provide sufficient facts 
to support a nexus between the student’s off-campus conduct and the 
school setting.99  There, a student, Jason Klein, was driven to an off-
campus restaurant where he saw his teacher, Mr. Clark, inside his car 
parked in front of the restaurant.100  Klein extended his middle finger 
toward his teacher and then exited the vehicle.101  When Klein returned 
to school, the administration suspended him for ten days “pursuant to a 
school rule that provides that students will be suspended for ‘vulgar or 
extremely inappropriate language or conduct directed to a staff 
member.’”102  Immediately after Klein’s suspension, he filed a motion for 
a temporary restraining order to enjoin the school from suspending him 
until the court reviewed the merits of the school’s action.103  The district 
court granted Klein’s temporary restraining order and after a full briefing 
on the matter, issued a permanent injunction against the school’s 
disciplinary suspension.104 
The district court held that the school’s discipline violated Klein’s 
First Amendment right to freedom of expression.105  The court reasoned 
that Klein’s conduct of “giving the finger” to his teacher was “far too 
attenuated” from the school grounds to support the school’s position 
that Klein violated the rule prohibiting discourteous conduct toward a 
teacher.106  In a footnote, Judge Gene Carter explained that Klein’s action 
would not cause a substantial disruption at school because the teacher’s 
“professional integrity, personal mental resolve, and individual character 
[is] not going to dissolve, willy-nilly, in the face of the digital posturing 
of this splenetic, bad-mannered little boy.”107 
 
 
 
 98. See id. at 403–04. 
 99. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986). 
 100. Id. at 1440. 
 101. Id. at 1441. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1441–42. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1441 n.4. 
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II. “WHEN IT COMES TO STUDENT CYBER-SPEECH, THE LOWER COURTS 
ARE IN COMPLETE DISARRAY . . . .”108 
Many scholars and federal courts apply the tests set forth in Tinker, 
Fraser, and other off-campus decisions—but there is no Supreme Court 
authority on this issue.109 
School teachers and authorities have a difficult job, and an 
important one. They must act—or not act—on the spot when students 
misbehave.  The rise of social media has complicated their jobs.  The 
First Amendment does not require school authorities to tolerate 
expressions that cause a substantial disruption in school.110  But where 
do teachers draw the line with online speech?  “It would be an unseemly 
and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school 
authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his [or] her actions 
there to the same extent that they can control that child when he [or] 
she participates in school sponsored activities.”111  On the other hand, in 
most cases, students post comments to their social media accounts after 
school hours, and the posts carry over into the school—either physically 
on phones, or verbally through the gossip mill. 
Online chatter easily influences students’ behavior in class.  Yet, 
teachers are rightfully hesitant to discipline students––cautious that 
taking action might result in a lawsuit.  Teachers need guidance on 
when they can and cannot constitutionally discipline a student for 
online speech. 
Although the Supreme Court has issued decisions and provided 
guidelines on the extent to which school authorities may discipline 
 
 108. Kenneth R. Pike, Comment, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by 
Repairing Judicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008 
BYU L. REV. 971, 990. 
 109. The Supreme Court considered whether to grant certiorari review of Layshock ex 
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), and Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).  However, on January 17, 2012, the 
Supreme Court denied the opportunity to hear any of the cases, leaving the issue 
unresolved and left to simmer in the lower courts.  See Tuesday, January 17, 2012, 
Certiorari––Summary Dispositions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 12 (Jan. 17, 
2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011712zor.pdf.  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court also denied certiorari in Doninger v. Niehoff.  See Doninger v. Niehoff, 
527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 110. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 111. Brian Wassom, Social Media and Student Discipline In Public Schools, 
WASSOM.COM (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.wassom.com/social-media-and-student-
discipline-in-public-schools.html (quoting Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 260). 
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students for off-campus conduct, the Court has not yet examined 
whether school administrators may discipline students for off-campus 
social media speech.  The dilemma that courts face is clear and is further 
highlighted by the wave of lower court decisions that involve students’ 
use of off-campus social media.  The discussion that follows analyzes 
several of these recent decisions. 
A. The Third Circuit’s Interpretation of Student Cyber Speech 
Courts that have considered the issues surrounding First 
Amendment speech rights of public school students have taken 
dramatically conflicting approaches in evaluating whether school 
administrators may discipline students for such off-campus cyber 
speech.  The extent of this problem is illustrated by two 2010 decisions 
issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: Layshock ex 
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock II)112 and J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. II).113  Both decisions dealt 
with students who published speech on the Internet using private off-
campus computers, and both were decided on February 4, 2010 by the 
Third Circuit.114 
In Layshock II, the Third Circuit applied Tinker and held that the 
school unconstitutionally disciplined a student who posted a fake 
Internet profile because there was no nexus between the off-campus 
speech and the school.115  In contrast, in J.S. II, the Third Circuit applied 
a different test and held that the school could discipline a student for off-
campus speech occurring on a fictitious MySpace profile because it was 
likely to create a substantial disruption in the classroom.116  From these 
decisions—issued on the same day—emerged two different standards 
within the Third Circuit for determining whether off-campus speech is 
actionable.117  Because the Third Circuit panels in Layshock II and J.S. II 
 
 112. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
 113. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 114. See id. at 290; Layschock II, 593 F.3d at 251–52. 
 115. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 263. 
 116. J.S. II, 593 F.3d at 303. 
 117. This Article will refer to the standards as the “nexus” standard and the 
“substantial disruption” standard. 
15
Strumwasser: Testing the Social Media Waters: First Amendment Entanglement Bey
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013
1. STRUMWASSER_FINAL - 1.8.14 WITH HEADING 1/17/2014  5:17 PM 
16 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
applied two conflicting standards, the Third Circuit reviewed both cases 
en banc on June 13, 2011.118 
1. The “Nexus” Requirement—Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage School District (Layshock II) 
In Layshock II, the Third Circuit held that school officials violated a 
student’s First Amendment free speech rights by disciplining him for 
creating a fake Internet “profile” of his principal on a social networking 
website.119  The case began “when Justin Layshock used his 
grandmother’s computer to access [MySpace,] a popular social 
networking [I]nternet web site where he created a fake [I]nternet 
‘profile’ of his high school principal.”120  On the fake profile, Layshock 
posted a survey of questions and answers about the principal’s likes and 
dislikes.121  Layshock crafted all of the principal’s answers to use the 
word “big” because the principal was “apparently a large man.”122  A 
synopsis of the fake profile appears below: 
Birthday: too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt 
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick 
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg[.]123 
Layshock’s friends and most of the school’s student body viewed the 
profile.124  Eventually, the teachers found out about Layshock’s profile 
and parent meetings ensued.125  Layshock apologized to the principal for 
creating the profile, and the school informed Layshock that an informal 
hearing about the profile he created was to be held.126  Afterward, the 
 
 118. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock III), 650 F.3d 205, 
205 (3d Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. III), 650 F.3d 915, 915 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
 119. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252. 
 120. Id.  “MySpace is a popular social-networking website that ‘allows its members to 
create online profiles, which are individual web pages on which members post 
photographs, videos, and information about their lives and interests.’”  Id. (quoting Doe 
v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
 121. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53. 
 122. Id. at 252. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 253. 
 125. Id. at 253–54. 
 126. Id. at 254. 
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school district found Layshock guilty of violating the school’s discipline 
code.127  As a result, the school suspended Layshock for ten days, banned 
him from participating in extracurricular activities, and prevented him 
from participating in his graduation ceremony.128 
Layshock’s parents filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania.129  The district court denied the 
Layshocks’ request for a temporary restraining order and ruled that a 
jury trial was necessary to determine damages and attorney’s fees.130  
“The parties subsequently filed a joint motion in which they stipulated to 
damages and requested entry of final judgment while preserving all 
appellate issues pertaining to liability.  The district court then entered a 
consent judgment, and this appeal and cross-appeal followed.”131 
The district court held, and the Third Circuit affirmed, that the 
profile Layshock created did not create a disruption under the standard 
set forth in Tinker.132  The district court explained that the case involved 
speech that “began with purely out-of-school conduct which 
subsequently carried over into the school setting.”133  The court then 
discussed Morse v. Frederick, and held that Morse was not the controlling 
law in this matter because Morse involved school-related speech, 
whereas this case involved off-campus speech.134  The court explained 
that because this case involved off-campus speech, “the school must 
demonstrate an appropriate nexus” between the student’s off-campus 
speech and the school.135  Relying on Tinker, the court held that the 
school impermissibly disciplined Layshock because the school district 
did “not establish[] a sufficient nexus between [Layshock’s] speech and a 
substantial disruption of the school environment.”136   
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that because the expressive 
conduct occurred beyond the schoolhouse gates and did not cause a 
disruption, the school district was “not empowered to punish his out of 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock I), 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. 
Pa. 2007). 
 130. Id. at 594. 
 131. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 255. 
 132. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600–01. 
 133. Id. at 595. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 599. 
 136. Id. at 600. 
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school expressive conduct under the circumstances here.”137  In support 
of its decision, the Third Circuit stated that “[a]llowing the District to 
punish [Layshock] for conduct he engaged in using his grandmother’s 
computer while at his grandmother’s house would create [an unseemly 
and dangerous] precedent.”138  Thus, the Third Circuit’s reliance on 
Tinker defines the outer boundaries of First Amendment protections of 
off-campus cyber speech. 
2. The “Substantial Disruption” Requirement—J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. 
Blue Mountain School District (J.S. II) 
On the same day that the Third Circuit issued Layshock II, a 
separate panel on the same court issued a contradictory opinion, based 
on similar facts, in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.139  
In J.S. II, J.S., an eighth grader, created a fictitious MySpace profile from 
her home computer.140  The MySpace profile featured the school’s 
principal, including his photograph and “profanity-laced statements 
insinuating that he was a sex addict and pedophile.”141  After the 
principal discovered the profile, he met with the school’s superintendent 
and director of technology, and together they determined that J.S.’s 
profile violated the School District’s Acceptable Use Policy.142  The 
principal claimed that the “imposter profile” was a level-four infraction 
under the school’s discipline code.143  After meeting with J.S., the 
principal suspended her for ten days and threatened legal action.144 
Subsequently, J.S. and her parents filed a complaint against the 
school district in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, alleging that the ten-day suspension violated J.S.’s First 
Amendment free speech rights.145  The district court determined that the 
discipline was unconstitutional under Tinker because it did not 
 
 137. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249, 
263 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 138. Id. at 260. 
 139. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 140. Id. at 291. 
 141. Id. at 290.  A synopsis of the “interests” section on the fictitious profile read as 
follows: “[g]eneral detention.  being a tight ass.  riding the fraintrain.  spending time 
with my child (who looks like a gorilla).  baseball.  my golden pen.  fucking in my office.  
hitting on students and their parents.”  Id. at 291. 
 142. Id. at 292. 
 143. Id. at 293. 
 144. Id. 
 145. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. I), No. 3:07-CV-585, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 72685, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008). 
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substantially and materially disrupt the school.146  The court 
distinguished the facts of the two cases by stating, “[i]n the instant case, 
the speech is not political [as in Tinker]; rather, it was vulgar and 
offensive statement ascribed to the school principal.  Therefore, we must 
look further into the case law to determine the standard we must use.”147  
As such, by applying a different standard, the district court held that the 
school’s suspension of J.S. did not violate her First Amendment rights 
because “the lewd and vulgar off-campus speech had an effect on-
campus.”148 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, 
albeit under a different analysis, and held that the profile, “though 
created off-campus, falls within the realm of student speech subject to 
regulation under Tinker.”149  The Third Circuit did not first consider 
whether the off-campus speech came on to the school’s campus.150  The 
court reasoned that J.S.’s profile created a reasonable possibility of a 
future disruption due to the sexually explicit content of the speech, and 
because the profile was posted online, it constituted “a public means of 
humiliating [the principal].”151 
The Third Circuit’s finding of a substantial disruption turned on the 
fact that the off-campus speech was posted on the Internet.152  The court 
reasoned that “due to the technological advances of the Internet,” the 
profile that J.S. created “could be, and in fact was, viewed by at least 
twenty-two members of the Middle School community within a matter 
of days.”153  Although the actual disruption was nonexistent, or minimal 
at best, the court reasoned that the substantial likelihood for future 
disruption was inevitable “especially in light of the inherent potential of 
the Internet to allow rapid dissemination of information.”154  In sum, the 
court concluded that the off-campus speech created or reasonably 
threatened to create a substantial disruption within the school, and 
therefore, the school district could discipline J.S., regardless of the fact 
that the speech occurred off-campus.155 
 
 146. Id. at *12. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at *22. 
 149. J.S. II, 593 F.3d at 298. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 300. 
 152. Id. at 300–01. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 301. 
 155. Id. 
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In a strong partial dissent, Judge Chagares argued that the school 
impermissibly suspended J.S. “for speech that took place outside the 
schoolhouse gates, during non-school hours, and that indisputably 
caused no substantial disruption in school.”156  Judge Chagares explained 
that he “believe[d] that this holding vests school officials with 
dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.”157  Judge Chagares 
reasoned that just because J.S. published the profile online, it was 
impermissible to assume that the profile would create a substantial 
disruption inside the schoolhouse gates.158  To the contrary, Judge 
Chagares opined that J.S.’s speech “caused no substantial disruption in 
school.”159  Judge Chagares accused the majority of misinterpreting the 
necessary balance between students’ First Amendment rights and school 
administrators’ need to maintain a proper learning environment.160  He 
went on to state that “the majority attempts to overcome this 
considerable hurdle by adopting the standard put forth by several of our 
sister courts of appeals, which allows schools to meet the Tinker test by 
showing that a substantial disruption was ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”161  
Judge Chagares argued that the majority’s position was contrary to the 
Tinker test.162  Even under that test, the facts do not reasonably support a 
forecast of disruption because “J.S. did not even intend for the speech to 
reach the school—in fact, she took specific steps to make the profile 
‘private’ so that only her friends could access it.”163 
In sum, Layshock II and J.S. II applied different variations of the 
Tinker standard and reached opposite conclusions on seemingly similar 
facts.  These decisions, published by the Third Circuit on the same day, 
are perfect examples of the clear misunderstanding of which standard 
applies when evaluating students’ off-campus cyber speech.  Because of 
the contradictory outcomes in Layshock II and J.S. II, the Third Circuit 
vacated both rulings and granted an en banc rehearing.164 
 
 156. Id. at 308. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 317. 
 159. Id. at 308. 
 160. Id. at 311. 
 161. Id. at 313 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 316. 
 164. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. III), 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. 
Dist. (Layshock III), 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
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3. The Third Circuit’s En Banc Review of Layshock II and J.S. II 
On review, the Third Circuit relied on Tinker in finding that the 
School District’s actions in J.S. III violated J.S.’s First Amendment 
rights.165  In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that an “undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right 
to freedom of expression.”166  Based on the facts in the record here, the 
Third Circuit distinguished the “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance” from “a reasonable forecast [of] a substantial disruption or 
material interference.”167  The court held that because the profile was 
created as a joke, and it was unlikely to be taken seriously, it did not 
create a reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption.168  Moreover, the 
court held that the evidence supported J.S.’s assertion that she did not 
intend for the speech to reach the school because she took steps to make 
the profile “private” so that only her friends could access it.169 
The Third Circuit’s en banc ruling affirmed that the Supreme Court 
has never “allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech 
that is not school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event and that 
caused no substantial disruption at school.”170  In the end, in both J.S. III 
and Layshock III, the Third Circuit held that the school administration 
could not discipline off-campus speech.171 
The discussion of Layshock and J.S. sets forth the clear dichotomy 
among circuit courts applying Tinker to off-campus cyber speech.  The 
cases demonstrate that courts are struggling to determine how Tinker 
applies to off-campus speech.  Whereas Layshock III focuses on the 
“nexus” between off-campus speech and the schoolhouse gates, J.S. III 
follows the logic and letter of Tinker and analyzes whether the off-
campus speech created a foreseeable “substantial disruption.” 
 
 
 165. J.S. III, 650 F.3d at 920. 
 166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 167. J.S. III, 650 F.3d at 930. 
 168. Id. at 929–30. 
 169. Id. at 929. 
 170. Id. at 933. 
 171. Id. at 920; Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock III), 650 
F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “under these circumstances, the First 
Amendment prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard to impose what 
might otherwise be appropriate discipline. . . . [and] that the school district’s response to 
[Layshock’s] conduct transcended the protection of free expression guaranteed by the 
First Amendment”). 
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B. Recent Rulings that Forbid School Administrators from Disciplining 
Off-Campus Speech 
Like the Third Circuit’s en banc rulings in Layshock III and J.S. III, 
several recent rulings from other courts have also held that school 
administrators cannot discipline off-campus speech.  For example, in 
Evans v. Bayer, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida held that Evans’s speech fell “under the wide umbrella of 
protected speech.”172  In Evans, school administrators suspended Evans, 
a high school senior, for creating a Facebook group that expressed her 
dislike for a teacher, Ms. Phelps.173  Evans titled the Facebook group 
“Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”174  Evans created 
the Facebook group off-campus, from her home computer.175  The court 
noted that Ms. Phelps never saw the Facebook group and that it did not 
create disruption at school.176  Once the school caught wind of Evans’s 
Facebook group and suspended her from school, Evans filed suit in the 
district court, asserting that the suspension violated her First 
Amendment rights.177 
Like the Third Circuit, the court held that Evans’s Facebook page 
was protected speech.178  The court relied on Tinker and stated that “the 
key” in determining whether the school administrators could suspend 
Evans for her Facebook group depended on “whether the school 
administrators have a well-founded belief that a ‘substantial’ disruption 
will occur.”179  The court determined that no facts in the complaint 
established that the school had a well-founded expectation that Evans’s 
Facebook group would create a disruption inside the school.180  Evans’s 
speech was merely an opinion about a teacher “that was published off-
campus, did not cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd, 
vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”181 
More recently, in T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community School 
Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana also 
 
 172. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 173. Id. at 1367. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1367–68. 
 178. Id. at 1377. 
 179. Id. at 1373. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1374. 
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upheld student speech rights.182  In this case, a group of 15 and 16-year-
old girls were suspended from their school volleyball team for posting 
provocative photos of themselves on MySpace, Facebook, and Photo 
Bucket.183  The photos were later given to school authorities, who 
suspended the girls from extra-curricular activities for the school year.184  
In suspending the students, the school relied on a policy in the Student 
Handbook that stated: “[i]f you act in a manner in school or out of 
school that brings discredit or dishonor upon yourself or your school, 
you may be removed from extra-curricular activities for all or part of the 
year.”185  The students, through their parents, filed suit alleging that the 
punishment violated their First Amendment rights of free speech.186  In 
the words of Chief Judge Philip P. Simon, writing for the court: 
Let’s be honest about it: the speech in this case doesn’t exactly call to 
mind high-minded civic discourse about current events.  And one could 
reasonably question the wisdom of making a federal case out of a 6–
game suspension from a high school volleyball schedule.  But for better 
or worse, that’s what this case is about and it is now ripe for 
disposition.187 
Ultimately, the court held that although the girls’ photos were ridiculous 
and inappropriate, they were expressive and subject to First Amendment 
protection.188 
Applying the Tinker substantial and material disruption test, the 
court reasoned that the girls’ pictures did not substantially disrupt the 
work and discipline of the school setting.189  Noting that an actual 
disruption is not required for school administrators to take action, the 
court reaffirmed that “Tinker requires a specific and significant fear of 
disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturbance.”190  In 
this case, the court held that the girls’ conduct did “not come close to 
meeting the Tinker standard.”191  Here, there was no disruption during 
any school activity and the students’ conduct did not interfere with 
 
 182. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784–85 
(N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 183. Id. at 771–72. 
 184. Id. at 773–74. 
 185. Id. at 773. 
 186. Id. at 771. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 775–76. 
 189. Id. at 784. 
 190. Id. at 782 (quoting Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2001)). 
 191. Id. at 783. 
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schoolwork.192  In sum, the court held that the facts in this case “can’t be 
what the Supreme Court had in mind when it enunciated the ‘substantial 
disruption’ standard in Tinker.  To find otherwise would be to read the 
word ‘substantial’ out of ‘substantial disruption.’”193 
C. Recent Rulings that Allow School Administrators to Discipline Off-
Campus Speech 
Notwithstanding the foregoing cases, several other courts have 
issued rulings that allow schools to discipline students for off-campus 
cyber speech.  In these instances, the courts have found that there is a 
sufficient nexus between the speech and the schoolhouse gates.194   
For example, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport 
Central School District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the student’s AOL Instant 
Messenger icon depicting a pistol firing a bullet over a person’s head 
would cross the schoolhouse gates because the icon included the words 
“Kill Mr. VanderMolen”––the student’s teacher.195  The court explained 
that there was, therefore, a sufficient nexus for the school to regulate the 
student’s off-campus cyber speech.196  As for Tinker’s substantial 
disruption requirement, the court held that “there can be no doubt that 
the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, 
would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the 
school environment.”197  
One year later, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit similarly 
held that a risk of substantial disruption created by a student’s off-
campus cyber speech was sufficient for the school to discipline the 
student.198  In Doninger, students on the Student Council planned a 
school-sponsored battle-of-the-bands concert.199  The school re-
scheduled the event and as a result, the plaintiff, a student council 
member, sent an e-mail from her father’s e-mail address urging parents 
to contact the school administrators regarding the rescheduling of the 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 784. 
 194. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, § 2:26, at 608–09. 
 195. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35–37 
(2d Cir. 2007). 
 196. Id. at 38–39. 
 197. Id. at 40. 
 198. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 199. Id. at 44. 
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concert.200  The plaintiff also posted a message on her publicly accessible 
blog.201  On plaintiff’s blog, she called school administrators 
“douchebags.”202  The school found out about the plaintiff’s blog, and 
subsequently barred her from running for senior class secretary.203  The 
plaintiff filed a lawsuit, alleging that the school violated her First 
Amendment freedom of speech rights.204  The district court upheld the 
school’s disciplinary conduct, concluding that a preliminary injunction 
was not warranted because the plaintiff “ha[d] failed to show a clear or 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits[.]”205   
On appeal, the Second Circuit relied on Tinker and held that “it was 
objectively reasonable for school officials to conclude that [plaintiff’s] 
behavior was potentially disruptive of student government functions . . . 
and that [plaintiff] was not free to engage in such behavior while serving 
as a class representative.”206  Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s holding.207 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, upholding the 
suspension of a student who engaged in off-campus online bullying.208  
In this case, Kowalski, a high school senior, created a MySpace group 
targeting a classmate named Shay.209  Kowalski called the MySpace group 
“SASH,” which stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes.”210  Kowalski 
invited about 100 others to join the MySpace Group, and over two dozen 
students responded and did join.211  Kowalski encouraged the group 
members to ridicule Shay on the MySpace page.212  Students uploaded 
 
 200. Id. at 44. 
 201. Id. at 45. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 46. 
 204. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210 (D. Conn. 2007) aff’d, 527 F.3d 
41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 205. Id. at 219. 
 206. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 351 (2d Cir. 2011).  The Second Circuit was 
faced with a subsequent appeal three years later after the plaintiff had graduated from 
high school where she sought damages.  The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to damages and that defendants had qualified immunity.  See id. at 344, 356–58. 
 207. Id. at 357. 
 208. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 209. Id. at 567–68. 
 210. Id. at 567. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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pictures of Shay and posted hurtful messages.213  As a result, school 
administrators suspended Kowalski from school and from the 
cheerleading team.214   
Kowalski filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia alleging, among other things, that the school 
district erroneously suspended her for “private out-of-school speech” in 
violation of the First Amendment.215  The district court granted 
summary judgment for the school district and held that it could suspend 
Kowalski for the content she posted on the Internet because it caused an 
in-school disruption.216 
On appeal, Kowalski asserted that “[t]he Supreme Court ha[d] been 
consistently careful to limit intrusions on students’ rights to conduct 
taking place on school property, at school functions, or while engaged in 
school-sponsored or school-sanctioned activity.”217  She argued that “no 
Supreme Court case addressing student speech has held that a school 
may punish students for speech away from school[;]” rather, “every 
Supreme Court case addressing student speech has taken pains to 
emphasize that, were the speech in question to occur away from school, 
it would be protected.”218 
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling hinged on the determination of whether 
Kowalski’s activity fell within the boundaries of the school’s interest “in 
maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being and 
educational rights of its students.”219  Relying on the nexus between 
Kowalski’s off-campus speech and the classroom setting, as well as the 
Tinker substantial disruption test, the Fourth Circuit noted: 
Kowalski used the Internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a 
classmate, and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to the 
school environment as to implicate the School District’s recognized 
authority to discipline speech which materially and substantially 
interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school and collid[es] with the rights of others.220 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 569. 
 215. Id. at 567, 570. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 571. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 567 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
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The court paid careful attention to the subject matter of Kowalski’s 
Internet activity—bullying another student.221  As such, its ruling 
protects school administrators’ actions because they “must be able to 
prevent and punish harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe 
school environment conducive to learning.”222  The court noted that 
there is certainly “a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the 
order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue 
originates outside the schoolhouse gate.”223  Nevertheless, the Fourth 
Circuit refrained from defining that limit in Kowalski.  Clearly, courts 
continue to struggle “to strike a balance between safeguarding students’ 
First Amendment rights and protecting the authority of school 
administrators to maintain an appropriate learning environment.”224 
III.  SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS ARE LEFT IN LIMBO 
Although off-campus cyber speech rulings apply facets of Tinker, 
the decisions leave school administrators wondering––how can they 
reconcile the inconsistent rulings?  Courts are clearly conflicted as to 
how far the school’s authority reaches to punish students’ off-campus 
cyber speech.  While courts continue to apply the “substantial 
disruption” Tinker test, the outcome under this test is inconsistent when 
applied to off-campus Internet speech.  Sometimes the school district 
wins.225 Sometimes the student wins.226  Sometimes courts within the 
same circuit issue conflicting rulings.227 
Until the Supreme Court addresses this issue, school administrators 
will remain rightfully hesitant to discipline students for their online 
content, wary of a lawsuit that may arise in the aftermath.  Thus, school 
administrators are left uncertain of the scope of their authority. 
 
 221. Id. at 572. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 573. 
 224. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. III), 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 225. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 226. See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. 
Ind. 2011); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 227. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 
249 (3d Cir. 2010); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (J.S. II), 593 F.3d 286 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
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When the Supreme Court finally addresses this issue, it should 
make clear when students’ off-campus online speech is intrusive enough 
to cause a “substantial disruption” inside schools.  In applying the Tinker 
substantial disruption test to cyber speech, the Court will likely focus on 
the nexus between the off-campus online content and examine its effect 
inside the school.  School authorities would be well served by a ruling 
that articulates what constitutes a de minimis disruption, where the 
school may not discipline a student, and what constitutes a substantial 
disruption that warrants discipline.   
The lower courts seem to have come to a consensus that online 
speech that leads to bullying, harassment, physical fights, the inability to 
keep control in the classroom, and the inability to teach the curriculum, 
creates a substantial disruption in school and therefore the school may 
discipline the student for such online speech.228  But, the effect of off-
campus cyber speech is more far reaching than those “clear cut” 
instances.  Students’ online remarks have also lead to stress for the 
harassed student, missing school, suicide attempts, failing grades, 
withdrawal from school clubs and activities—and the list goes on.  
Should such circumstances constitute a substantial disruption?  Or are 
they merely de minimis, and therefore outside the school administrators’ 
disciplinary arm?  Alas, we await a ruling from the Supreme Court for an 
answer. 
IV. CONCLUSION––A WORD TO THE WISE 
Because there are no clear parameters surrounding school 
administrators’ authority to discipline students for off-campus online 
content, school systems should proceed carefully when dealing with 
students whose online content makes its way to the classroom.  
Nevertheless, schools cannot avoid the issue altogether because it is 
quite evident that social media is here to stay.  Until the Supreme Court 
addresses this issue, the decisions illustrated in this Article should guide 
school authorities in disciplining students for their off-campus Internet 
speech. 
School administrators should continue to act with caution when 
disciplining students for online content and should remain aware that 
many students are apt to challenge school authority in the courts.  In the 
event that discipline leads to litigation, school administrators must be 
able to show that the students’ online content caused, or could have 
 
 228. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 
35. 
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol36/iss1/1
1. STRUMWASSER_FINAL - 1.8.14 WITH HEADING 1/17/2014  5:17 PM 
2013] SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 29 
reasonably caused, a substantial disruption at school.  Although we do 
not know what exactly constitutes a substantial disruption, school 
administrators should protect themselves by creating a clear record that 
provides evidence of a nexus between the off-campus content and 
instances of disruption inside the school.  While there are no hard and 
fast rules as to what constitutes a substantial disruption, this standard 
certainly requires more than the display of a student’s impermissible off-
campus conduct.   
School administrators will also be well served to create social media 
policies and to distribute them to all students, faculty, and parents at the 
beginning of each school year.  Such policies would benefit both 
students and educators by setting the expectations of the school.  Social 
media policies that include constitutionally permissible restrictions 
would benefit school administrators and school districts in defending 
cyber speech lawsuits.  Until the Supreme Court stakes its claim, school 
authorities should shape social media policies around the Tinker 
substantial disruption test. 
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